Low-thrust mission risk analysis, with application to a 1980 rendezvous with the comet Encke by Smith, D. B. & Yen, C. L.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Technical Memorandum 33-593
Low-Thrust Mission Risk Analysis,
to a 1980 Rendezvous With the
C. L. Yen
D. B. Smith
With Application
Comet Encke
/(NASA'CR-131518) LOW-THRUST MISSION RISK N73-21813ANALYSIS, WITH APPLICATION TO A 1980RENDEZVOUS WITH THE COMET ENCKE (JetPropulsion Lab.) 35 p HC $3.75 CSCL 22A UnclasG3/30 68283 I
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA
March 15, 1973
/
I
if
:,
:: : , ,S ;, 0 ,: '- (U' i ; \ 0 \ , 4 j z z 0 T :~~~~~~~·.1 i
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19730013086 2020-03-23T02:45:44+00:00Z
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Technical Memorandum 33-593
Low- Thrust Mission Risk Analysis, With Application
to a 1980 Rendezvous With the Comet Encke
C. L. Yen
D. B. Smith
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA
March 15, 1973
Prepared Under Contract No. NAS 7-100
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PREFACE
The work described in this report was performed by the Mission
Analysis Division of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-593 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of M. McKinley of
the K. M.S. Technology Center and T. A. Barber of the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory for providing valuable suggestions. The generous support of
C. G. Sauer in obtaining necessary trajectory information is most
appreciated.
JPL: Technical Memorandum 33 - 593iv
I.
II.
III.
CONTENTS
Introduction ..................................
Model Overview ...............................
Risk Factors ................................
A. Operational Mode Risk Factors .. ...............
1. Trajectory control policy and trajectory
error analysis ........................
2. Thruster burn control policy ...............
B. Hardware Risk Factors ......................
1. Thruster power rating and number of thrusters
2. Power conditioner and thruster switching matrix
3. Thruster array geometry
4. Thrust subsystem reliability ...............
IV. Risk Prediction Method .
V. 1980 Encke Rendezvous Mission Risk Analysis 
A. Hardware Risk Factors ......................
1. Thruster power rating . . . ................
2. Number of thrusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Symmetry requirements on thruster firing.
4. Hardware failure parameters ..............
B. Operational Mode Risk Factors .................
1. Definition of mission success ...............
2. Trajectory control policy and trajectory
error analysis .........................
3, Thruster burn control policy ...............
C. Risk Prediction ............................
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-593
1
2
3
4
4
4
6
6
7
........ ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7
8
11
11
11
11
11
11
12
12
13
13
14
v
CONTENTS (contd)
D. Results and Conclusions .
1. Effects of hardware reliability on thrust
subsystem design ............... ......
2. Effects of symmetry requirements .
3. Effects of trajectory design . . . ..........
4. Class III mission goal ................
5. Effects of burn policy ....................
VI. Recommendations ................ . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........
TABLES
1. Failure modes and mathematical models .
2. Characteristics of an Encke rendezvous mission 
3. Forbidden thruster combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. A computer output for a failure process simulation
and the associated probability .
5. Probability of success for a 1980 Encke
rendezvous mission ...................... . .
FIGURES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Probability tree for mission operational process .....
Risk factors and risk assessment . . ......
An example of a reliability curve . ................
Geometric configuration of 7-thruster system ........
Power profile, 1980 Encke rendezvous mission .....
6. Admissible trajectory alternatives (trajectory tree) . . .
7. Example of an equal-burn control policy ............
8. Constant-risk contour map for 1980 Encke rendezvous
mission, Class II mission goal...................
9. Constant-risk contour map for 1980 Encke rendezvous
mission, Class I mission goal ...................
JPL Technical Memorandum 33-593
14
14
15
15
16
16
17
17
18
19
19
20
21
22
22
23
23
24
25
26
27
28
vi
ABSTRACT
A computerized multistage failure process simulation procedure is
used to evaluate the risk in a solar electric space mission. The procedure
uses currently available thrust-subsystem reliability data and performs
approximate simulations of the thrust subsystem burn operation, the sys-
tem failure processes, and the retargeting operations. The method is
applied to assess the risks in carrying out a 1980 rendezvous mission to the
comet Encke. Analysis of the results and evaluation of the effects of
various risk factors on the mission show that system component failure
rates are the limiting factors in attaining a high mission reliability. It is
also shown that a well-designed trajectory and system operation mode can
be used effectively to partially compensate for unreliable thruster
performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One unique feature of a low-thrust system is the ability to accomplish
the primary mission and/or science objectives even if one or more of its
thrusters fail, so long as the solar panel power output (energy supply)
remains available. This flexibility can greatly increase the probability of a
mission's success, 1 if a complete scenario of alternate thrust profiles is
included as part of the mission operations strategy. This avoids excessive
reliance on redundant hardware or expensive improvements in hardware
reliability and longevity.
Previous reliability studies, such as Refs. 1 and 2, do not consider
the effects of these alternate maneuver possibilities. Further refinements
and realistic risk assessment require development of analysis techniques to
cope with this additional, fundamentally complex factor. Within this general
context, we seek a methodology which evaluates risk with at least first order
correctness and maximum practical utility.
A discrete, multistage process simulation procedure is used. Essen-
tially, continuous and infinite processes are modeled as discrete and finite
sequences. The discrete simulation approach, with finite stochastic
sequences, is especially attractive for low-thrust missions since the actual
flight mode will probably be operationally discrete anyway. Various thrust
subsystem parameters, hardware reliability factors, and mission opera-
tion modes, which affect the process simulation and thus the assessed value
of the risks, are analyzed. The results of such analyses provide guidelines
for rational thrust-subsystem design and can be used to identify the key risk
factors.
1 The simple mission success criteria used here assume a satisfactory
science return if a specified set of state conditions such as rendezvous,
flyby, etc. are achieved within a desired time period.
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II. MODEL OVERVIEW
The performance of a desired mission is tied to the operation of a
system. To assess the risk in a mission, one must understand the proposed
mission profile, the operational system, and its operational processes.
In this study, the system is a solar electric (SEP) spacecraft with
attention focused on the thrust subsystem. Generally, a thrust subsystem
comprises several units of power conditioners (PC) and thrusters intercon-
nected by a switching mechanism.
In a SEP mission, since the thrust power varies with time, the number
of thrusters needed to be burning at various phases of the mission must vary
according to the power level. Therefore, operation of this system requires
not only the steering of the spacecraft along the desired path (vector control),
but also the timely switching of thrusters (thruster burn control) to match
the power.
For the purpose of the risk analysis, the state of the operational sys-
tem at time t, S(t), is conveniently defined in the following way:
U 1 T
X U 2 T
s(t) = , U = T = (1)
UN TN
where U and T are column vectors with N components, used to represent
the status and elapsed burn time of the N given thrusters. Components of
U are integers (2), (1) or (0) depending on whether the thruster is operating,
idling, or failed, and X represents the spacecraft states (X, Y, Z, VX ,
Vy, VZ). Propagation of the operational system state S from time t to
t + At is governed by the operational control policies, namely a path control
policy (such as payload optimizing control, minimum mission time control,
etc. ) and a burn control policy. A unique, well-defined control policy must
be able to transfer the state in a unique manner with 100 percent certainty.
But, as in any real dynamic system, the state of the system is under the
influence of uncontrollable internal and external random forces, and the
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actual behavior of the controls forces the state to exhibit deviations. Thus,
the state transitions from Si(t) to Sj(t+At) can be described only in probabil-
istic terms. The sole source of random control concerned with here is the
thruster failures, and this failure statistic is assumed to be given. Other
small random forces such as process noise (noise in the thrust vector) are
considered as insignificant for this risk analysis. Since a thruster failure
destroys a large fraction of the thrust subsystem capability, the stochastic
failure effects predominate in this operational system. This operational
process is complex because (1) it is continuous in time, (2) the process con-
trol is time-dependent (both in deterministic control and random failure),
(3) the state S(t) occupies a continuous space and, above all, (4) the random
effects can be violent. This complexity indicates that an analytical approach,
such as setting up differential equations for the deviations (Ref. 3), cannot
be used, and this leads to a simulation procedure. Monte Carlo simulation
could be used if one were to ignore the trajectory control effects on the mis-
sion and simulate only the burn control processes for a particular thrust
program (Refs. 1 and 2). If one includes the trajectory aspect in this type
of simulation in a straightforward manner, the trajectory computation cost
becomes prohibitive.
The procedure used here is that of discretized simulation. Time is
divided into stages, and X and T are conceptually discretized at each stage
time, by way of an approximate representation, as will be discussed in detail
later. Since the U component of the system state S is denumerable, the state
at each stage time can be counted. This procedure reduces the process to
a multistage diverging network problem. For the risk analysis, the proba-
bility tree corresponding to such processes can be constructed. The propa-
gation along all the successful paths can be computer simulated and the
probability of success obtained (see Fig. 1). Nonetheless, since the tree can
branch out very quickly as the stage progresses forward, a compromise
must be made between the accuracy and the volume of computation.
III. RISK FACTORS
Various risk factors included in this risk assessment procedure are
shown in Fig. 2. A detailed description and analysis of each of these risk
factors are presented in the following sections.
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A. Operational Mode Risk Factors
The impact of a failure on the mission goal depends on the time and
type of failures (failure modes). Fatal failure modes can be identified by
systematic trajectory error analysis. The probability of occurrence of such
failure events depends not only on the nature of the hardware but also on the
strategy used in operating the available thrusters (burn policy). In planning
a mission, careful trajectory design can ease the impact of the most probable
failures on the mission goal. At the same time, a well-planned burn policy
can considerably reduce the probability of fatal failure events.
1. Trajectory control policy and trajectory error analysis. Mis-
sion goals can be attained in more than one way for a given mission. This
is particularly true of a continuously propelled, solar-electric mission.
Trajectory error analysis consists of identifying nonfatal (admissible)
failure modes and providing alternate controls. In order to carry out such
an analysis, a clear definition of mission success must be given. Once this
is done, the impact of a failure can be evaluated and decisions can be made
regarding the subsequent system control. In the event that the failure is
severe enough to require a path modification, a path control policy is needed
to modify the path to satisfy the mission goal in a unique manner. This
policy will depend on the type of mission, but generally it can be as follows.
The policy of control modification will be first to attain the final spacecraft
state requirement (relative to the target) at the time closest to the nominal
time. When this is impossible, it may resort to a secondary policy which
will relax the final probe state constraints.
2. Thruster burn control policy. At every decision point of the
mission operation process, the thrust-subsystem state [ U(t), 7T (t) ] is given.
Be it perfect or degraded by failures, the desired thrust program (that is,
the varying power levels) must be matched according to a burn control
policy. This policy is used to control the choice of thrusters, the switching
time of the thrusters, and the duration of the thruster burn allocations at
every phase of the mission.
Elaboration on such a policy may be made by closely following the
result of the trajectory error analysis to enhance mission success. Simple
models of the burn policy can be as follows. The number of burning
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thrusters should be the minimum possible, as this avoids operation of the
thrusters at low efficiency levels. The choice of thrusters to be on should
not violate thruster array symmetry requirements and should attempt to
maintain the smallest number of switching operations and distribute the load
of burn evenly on all the available thrusters. The criterion for choosing a
burn policy is its reliability. There are several different sources of fail-
ures, as will be discussed later in the section on hardware reliability. The
least-switching and equal-burn policies discussed below are considered to
give the highest reliability under such a reliability model.
Given a thrust program, the required total burn time T B can be
obtained simply by adding the product of the number of thrusters and the
burn time for different phases of the mission (see Fig. 5). If T. is the
1
assigned burn time for the ith thruster, the reliability R of such a burn
policy would be
R = r(T1 ) r(T2 ) · r(TN) (2)
with the constraint
T1 + T2 + · TN = TB
where
r(T) = (PC + thruster) system reliability
N = Number of thrusters used
If the lifetime of the thrusters is very long and r(Ti) are essentially of the
exponential type,
r(T i ) = e (4)
then the reliability of performing the required burn
R = eTB (5)
is independent of the burn policy as long as the existing number of thrusters
meets the minimum requirement. However, in reality, thruster life is of
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finite duration and can be considerably shorter than the mission flight time.
Because r(T i ) - 0 as T. approaches the lifetime, leading to complete failure,1
an arbitrary burn policy must be avoided. Since failure rates are mono-
tonically increasing functions of elapsed burn time under the assumed reli-
ability model, it can readily be proven that equal distribution of burn time
to the existing thrusters would be the minimum risk policy.
Minimization of R with the constraint of (Eq. (3)) requires that
_(T 1 ) i(T2 ) i(TN)
r(T1 ) r(T2 ) r(TN) minus hazard rates (6)
which can be satisfied if T = T2 TN N. The above argument
disregards the risks associated with thruster restart. In actual operation,
it is perhaps more convenient to operate thrusters continuously as long as
the operating condition is good and the switching of thrusters takes place
only as a result of failures or as the number of thrusters burning is to be
changed. Without sufficient spares, such a policy would have little chance
to succeed in the most desirable mission mode. However, the probabilities
of attaining the mission objectives in alternative modes could be great
enough to be acceptable. This procedure is termed the "least-switching
policy". In this study, the equal-burn policy is emphasized, where the con-
sideration of equal-burn distribution is of primary importance and the least
switching consideration is of secondary importance.
B. Hardware Risk Factors
1. Thruster power rating and number of thrusters. Once a nominal
mission and the reference trajectory are chosen, the required power profile,
which varies as a function of time, is determined. Since the thrust mode
presupposes full utilization of solar panel output power, the thrust subsys-
tem must be designed to operate with such a power history (power matching).
The general practice of power matching is, first, to provide a number N of
thrusters of given power rating (Pr) (power input to power conditioner) such
that (NPr) is at least equal to the maximum power yield of the solar panel
during the entire mission. The variations in the power profile are matched
by adjusting the number of engines in operation and, at the same time, rely-
ing on the ability of the engines to throttle in the range of about 2 to 1.
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The engine power rating affects the mission reliability mainly through
its impact on the possibilities of trajectory reshaping. The intuitive
assumption that many smaller engines are more favorable than fewer larger
ones (in that, following a failure (smaller power loss), the former leaves
more chance of mission completion in alternative modes) is correct. Never-
theless, the thrust-subsystem specific mass increases as the power rating
is decreased. This and the thruster array configuration design constraints
should restrict the allowable value of P to a practical range.
Provision of spare thrusters always increases mission reliability.
The required number of spares to attain a certain reliability depends on all
other risk factors. Assuming, however, that all other risk factors remain
the same, one can conduct risk analysis on all feasible (N-Pr) combinations.
Prior to an actual subsystem design, such information is most desirable, as
it will expedite the selection of a design point which is most cost-effective,
compatible with design constraints, and deliver the needed success confi-
dence level.
2. Power conditioner and thruster switching matrix. The use of
switching mechanisms to allow interconnection of a power conditioner (PC)
to many thrusters may add to system reliability. To include this factor in
the analysis, in addition to the modeling of the switching logic, the switching
mechanism reliability data must be given. Because this was beyond the
scope of the study, the simulation of independent PC failures was not per-
formed. One-to-one PC-thruster connections were assumed; thus the fail-
ure probabilities used represent the PC-plus-thruster unit.
3. Thruster array geometry. Because of spacecraft attitude stabil-
ization requirements, the simultaneous operation of thrusters in some com-
binations is forbidden. The constraints reduce the possible alternatives in
thruster burn in case of failures, and the burn strategy simulation must
exclude such combinations.
4. Thrust subsystem reliability. The key constituents of reliability
in the thrust-subsystem must be identified for a failure analysis. The
mathematical models of failures must be established to allow a quantitative
description of the failure probabilities. Systematic testing programs are
needed to obtain actual failure distributions in the time domain and in the
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operating environment extremes. At present, the data available are of a
preliminary and speculative nature. However, these preliminary data can
be used to carry out parametric studies wherein the parameters cover the
entire possible range.
The key failure modes considered are:
(1) Thruster life. Thruster life is limited by grid wear-out or by
depletion of the cathode emissive material.
(2) Thruster or power conditioner component failure. According
to standard reliability engineering procedure, such failures can
be considered to have a Poisson distribution.
(3) Thruster restart failure. The risks involved in restarting a
thruster are modeled by using a binomial distribution.
(4) Delivery or infant failure. Conventional modeling of this type of
failure can be made. However, in this study, it is assumed that
the thrusters would be tested thoroughly and that this type of
failure can be ignored.
Table 1 summarizes explicitly the mathematical models used. (See
Ref. 4 for the standard reliability modeling. ) A typical computer plot of the
reliability curve R(t) is shown in Fig. 3.
IV. RISK PREDICTION METHOD
As introduced earlier in this section, the risk prediction method simu-
lates countable discrete multistage processes and also calculates the corre-
sponding probabilities.
This approach minimizes the labor of numerous trajectory computa-
tions by concentrating on a finite number of trajectory alternatives which
can be used to approximate any of the actual alternative trajectories. The
main purpose of the analysis is to investigate the mission feasibility and the
probability of mission success. It is not mandatory to have very accurate
trajectory profiles to conduct this type of study. In the following, a step-
by-step description of computerized risk prediction and process simulation
procedure is given.
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Step 1. A finite number of trajectory points is systematically chosen
to divide sequentially the entire mission into M different phases. The
division can be based on the time interval during which the desirable number
of thrusters that are turned on is constant. However, the size of a phase
interval should not be too large. These time points constitute the decision
time s.
Step 2. At the beginning of each phase, the admissible failures are
identified and alternative paths constructed. This method proceeds in a
chronological order. As the stages progress, it is necessary to branch into
a number of different paths, thus forming a trajectory tree. A summary of
the resulting trajectory tree can be constructed in a graphical form, where
correspondences between the thrust subsystem status (only the number of
surviving thrusters) and the paths are shown. In general, the correspond-
ence is one path to many thrust subsystem states. Besides, the only infor-
mation important for the probability calculation is the power profile change
along the alternate paths. This information is stored in the computer.
Step 3. Thruster reliability data are calculated by using assumed
models, and the data are stored in a tabular form.
Step 4. The thruster burn is started in accordance with a burn policy
and a nominal thrust program at the beginning of ith mission phase.
Step 5. A failure mode Ii, which may occur during the ith phase if
step 4 were executed, is simulated. If there are N. thrusters available at1
the end of the last phase, it is possible to have
( Ni)
different modes of failures, where C N i is a binominal coefficient. TheJ
probability of this Iith failure mode is computed using the results of Step 3.
Discard all events having less than 10 probability.
Step 6. If the failure mode I. is not fatal, the thrust mode modification1
based on Step 2 is applied (i.e., path modification), the engine burn
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allocation revised, and the ith phase completed. The probability of the
ith phase completion
in this revised mode is then computed.
No random number generating schemes are used to assign an exact
time of failure. It is assumed that the impact of a failure occurring any time
within the phase is approximately the same as if it were occurring at the
beginning of the phase. Thus, revision of burn allocation always starts at
the beginning of the phase. This gives conservative estimates.
Step 7. Proceed to (i+l)th phase: Steps 4 to 6 are repeated until the
last phase of the mission is completed. The probability of mission comple-
tion with a failure history I (sequential failure modes Ii, I = 1, M constitute
a failure history), is
M
PI n PI.(i)
i=l 1
Step 8. Steps 3 to 7 are repeated for all possible failure histories,
giving a total success probability of
I
The justification and advantage of the above procedure can be argued as
follows:
(1) In the limit, where the number of phases chosen becomes
infinitely large and the interval infinitely small, the method of
prediction is mathematically exact.
(2) By a convenient choice of phases, an approximate trajectory pre-
diction can be made, which in turn greatly reduces the labor of
trajectory reoptimization.
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(3) The inaccuracies in prediction made by the finite interval
procedure can actually be measured only if one experiments
with the size of the interval. This procedure is impractical
from a computational point of view (at least, in the case of the
Encke mission risk analysis used as an example in the next
sections) because the required number of failure history simula-
tions increases almost exponentially as the number of phases is
increased. However, the estimate is on the pessimistic side,
and it is believed that the error cannot be large; it is probably
insignificant compared with whatever errors were being com-
mitted in the modeling of the hardware reliabilities.
V. 1980 ENCKE RENDEZVOUS MISSION RISK ANALYSIS
As an example of this risk assessment procedure and the type of infor-
mation that can be generated by its application, an analysis was made of an
Encke rendezvous mission for the 1980 opportunity.
A mission with the general mission profile shown in Table 2 was
selected for analysis.
A. Hardware Risk Factors
1. Thruster power rating. This study assumes that the maximum
allowable power input to a PC-plus-thruster system is 3. 23 kW with a
throttling ratio of 2 to 1. The 3. 23-kW number is assigned to match the
expected maximum solar array output power of 16. 14 kW during the mission,
using five thrusters. However, this number is compatible with a 30-cm
thruster being considered at JPL.
2. Number of thrusters. Thrust subsystems with 5, 6, and
7 thrusters are analyzed in this study.
3. Symmetry requirements on thruster firing. Consider a
7-thruster system which has the geometrical configuration shown in Fig. 4.
The simultaneous operation of combinations of thrusters which are prohibited
is summarized in Table 3.
4. Hardware failure parameters. No firm data could be obtained
regarding the reliability of the thrust subsystem. However, based on the
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content of Ref. 5 (private communication from NASA Lewis Research
Center), the following assumptions were made:
(1) Thruster life in the range of 300 to 450 days was assumed. In
practice, thruster life is measured in terms of ampere-hours.
In modeling the wearout failure, the independent parameter
should be the elapsed burn time in ampere-hour units (defined
as effective elapsed burn-time). At a fractional-power-level
operation, such as in Phase VIII (see below), where a thruster
is to operate at about the 50% level, the effective burn time
should be 44 days instead of 88 days. The conversion of simple
burn-time into effective burn-time was not carried out in this
study.
(2) For thrusters, failure rates of (6 - 10)/106 h are assumed.
For PCs, the failure rates are estimated to be about the same
as for the thrusters. Allowing an error with a factor of 2, fail-
ure rates in the range (6 - 50)/106 h were used for the thrusters
plus PCs.
(3) A somewhat arbitrary number of 10 was assigned for thruster
restart failures.
B. Operational Mode Risk Factors
1. Definition of mission success. Three different classes of suc-
cess are considered in this study:
(1) Class I, the selected mission mode. In this mode, rendezvous
with Encke occurs at the desired rendezvous time of -47 days
to Tp.
(2) Class II, a degraded but acceptable rendezvous mode. Here,
the mission goals are considered attained if the spacecraft can
achieve rendezvous with Encke at any time between -47 to
-27 days to Tp. This also ensures that the heliocentric radius
of the spacecraft is larger than 0. 7 AU at encounter.
(3) Class III, including flybys, if relative velocities are, less than
1 km/sec.
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As explained in Section II, Class II and Class III goals are included to
explore the effects of the trajectory control policy on the predicted risks.
2. Trajectory control policy and trajectory error analysis. At the
onset of the selected mission, the thrust power level profile is expected to
follow the curve given in Fig. 5. Even though this profile may change due
to failures as the mission progresses, this power profile constitutes the
basis for the thrust subsystem design and the power matching burn control
of the first phase of the mission. Note the absence of a coast phase and the
high power levels appearing at the initial and final phases of the mission.
In accordance with Step 1 of the risk prediction method described in the pre-
vious section, the entire mission duration is divided into 15 different mis-
sion phases. This division of mission phases coincides with the times where
the number of burning thrusters changes. The long phase of about 620 days
in the middle where only one thruster needs to be burning is further divided
into seven smaller phases for multistage simulation. The path control policy
used to generate alternative paths, in case of severe failures, for the
Class II goal is to attain a perfect rendezvous condition with minimum ren-
dezvous time slippage from the Class I goal.
For the Class III success category, there are some difficulties in the
calculations due to limitations existing in currently available low-thrust
trajectory software. The results of trajectory error analysis as described
are summarized in the trajectory tree shown in Fig. 6. There are seven
different paths in this figure. These paths are considered to approximate
adequately any of the actual paths the spacecraft will pursue following
admissible failures. The straight lines between neighboring nodes represent
one segment of the spacecraft path. Branching of the path appears as fail-
ures of different degrees occur.
3. Thruster burn control policy. Both the equal-burn policy and
the least-switching policy were considered in this study. To illustrate the
concept, the burn control expected for the selected mission can be planned
as shown in Fig. 7. Also shown in Fig. 5 with the power profile is the mini-
mum number of thrusters required at each phase of the mission, along with
the expected average thruster burn allocation for thrust subsystems with
5-, 6-, or 7-thruster arrays.
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C. Risk Prediction
An example of the computer output simulating a single failure process
(failure history) and the corresponding probabilities as described in Steps 4
to 7 of the risk prediction method is given in Table 4. The assessed mis-
sion success probability is derived from a very large number (up to
106 cases) of such simulations.
D. Results and Conclusions
The predicted success probabilities for the 1980 Encke rendezvous
mission are summarized in Table 5. These are shown as a function of
thrust subsystem failure parameter sets (i.e., thruster life and failure
rate) and mission class. Effects of symmetry requirements and the least-
switching policy were examined for one set of hardware failure parameters.
Conversion of the data of Table 5 into a constant risk-contour map (see
Fig. 8) revealed some useful information regarding the hardware design
requirements. The following conclusions were drawn from the data
obtained.
1. Effects of hardware reliability on the thrust subsystem design.
As assumed previously, if 3. 23 kW were a convenient thruster power level
for design, then the 5-thruster system would obviously not be satisfactory:
it does not guarantee 90% reliability even when using very optimistic
hardware-failure data. For 6-thruster and 7-thruster systems, constant-
risk contours for the Class II mission goal are plotted on a failure parameter
plane (Fig. 8). The shaded domain represents the currently assumed failure
data bounds. If less than 1% risk is desired for a N = 6 or N = 7 system, the
design effort must be made to shift the hardware failure data domain to the
left of the 1% curve. Note the asymptotic behavior of constant-risk curves.
As the thruster-life parameter increases, the constant-risk curve
approaches asymptotically to a constant-failure-rate line. At the other
extreme, the constant-risk curve tends to coincide with a constant-thruster-
life line as the failure rate approaches zero. This implies that, with a
fixed number of thrusters and a given failure rate, improvement in thruster
life beyond a point does not contribute to the reduction of mission risks.
For the same reason, given a fixed thruster life, design efforts beyond a
point to reduce hardware failure rate is ineffective.
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With the current design baseline, Fig. 8 indicates that thruster life
is not the key risk factor in controlling the Encke mission if a 6- or
7-thruster system is desired. The low-risk contours are approaching the
constant-failure-rate lines at the current thruster life expectancy. To
reduce the mission risk, it is more effective and desirable to control the
failure rate to less than the asymptotic value. For a 7-thruster system,
the desirable 1% risk curve tends to approach the failure rate 15 line
after a thruster life of above 500 days. Thus, unless one is fairly sure of
controlling the failure rate to less than 15 per 106 h, a 7-thruster system
cannot attain a 99% chance of success, even with very long-lasting thrusters.
In this case, an 8-thruster system will be required, or the advantage of
multichannel PC to thruster switching must be investigated. If a thruster
failure rate of 6 and a PC failure rate of 7, as predicted by the hardware
technicians, were reliable, then a 7-thruster system could be considered to
be adequate because, by all indications, thrusters lasting 450- 500 days
are within reach with present technology.
2. Effects of symmetry requirements. In view of the conclusions
reached above, only the 7-thruster system needs to be considered. Even
though the data obtained are not exhaustive, it is expected that, within the
current failure data domain, the symmetry constraint can degrade the mis-
sion reliability by no more than 1%.
3. Effects of trajectory design. The data in Table 5 show signifi-
cantly greater success probabilities for the Class II mission goal as com-
pared to the Class I goal, which means that a mission design which allows
up to a 20-day encounter time delay helps to ease the mission risk consider-
ably. This fact, in turn, eliminates the possibility of over-designing the
thrust subsystem. The risk contour plots for the Class I mission goal shown
in Fig. 9 illustrate this point. The confidence levels exhibited for a
7-thruster system appear similar to that of the 6-thruster system shown in
Fig. 8. Thus, if the possibility of a Class II type of achievement were dis-
regarded and the design point were chosen in the manner discussed in the
previous paragraph, an 8-thruster system would have to be recommended.
This is one thruster more than required. Since the main cause of the risk
lies in the large random failure rates of the components which basically are
difficult to control, it appears that it is much more effective to compensate
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for the hardware unreliability by means of an over-designed trajectory
rather than an over-designed thrust--subsystem. It is, therefore, recom-
mended that future mission designs should consider risk aspects in the
construction of the trajectory rather than adhering to the payload optimiza-
tion procedure.
4. Class III mission goal. Consideration of the Class III mission
goal and the chances of success have not been investigated in as much detail
as the Class II mission goal. The main difficulty in analyzing this class of
mission is in forming the trajectory tree. Because there is no software
which will generate a minimum flyby velocity (Vhp) and the associated tra-
jectory simultaneously, it is necessary to scan over many Vhps until a pos-
sible minimum is reached, which requires many trajectory searches. In
addition to the freedom in the choice of Vhp < 1 km/s, there is another
degree of freedom, the encounter time (T end) in establishing the failure-
mode to alternate thrust-mode correspondence. This added degree of free-
dom in the choice of available trajectories demands another law (criterion)
to single out one point in the acceptable (Vhp - Tend) domain and the corre-
sponding thrust mode. In this particular study, where rendezvous mission
is the main interest, no extra effort was made to solve the problem of the
flyby-class goal in an exact manner. However, a preliminary study of the
possibility of flyby missions (Vhp < 1 km/s) in case of severe failures was
made. An arbitrarily selected, but valid, failure-to-flyby-mode correspond-
ence was set up and the risks evaluated for a 5-thruster system. The
results show that, for median failure parameters, the probability of success
for the Class III mission goal is 94% compared with_87% for the Class II
mission goal. This number indicates that uncertainties (2 - 3% risks) in
the recommended 7-thruster system can be completely erased if the
Class III mission goal is considered acceptable.
5. Effects of burn policy. As expected, the least-switching policy
is inferior when compared to the equal-burn policy in achieving either
Class I or Class II mission goals. This is particularly true for a Class I
mission objective because thruster life is limited and only a limited number
of thrusters are available. As the assumed wearout life becomes long and
the number of available thrusters becomes large, normal failure dominates,
and the risk becomes insensitive to the policy. Such appears to be the case
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for the recommended 7-thruster system in achieving a Class II mission
goal. For currently estimated failure data, the difference in predicted risk
between the least-switching and the equal-burn policies is not expected to be
more than 1 to 2% for the 7-thruster system.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Wider application of this technique to other missions may be attempted
to acquire a deeper understanding of the risk aspects of an SEP mission.
Refinements to the method of risk prediction and the algorithm of failure-
process simulations are most desirable. Further research in this area,
with a better understanding and model of an actual SEP flight operation, may
result in a more accurate semi-analytic approach to the problem, which is
most vital for the support of SEP missions.
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Table 2. Characteristics of an Encke
rendezvous mission
Event
Launch date
Arrival date
Solar panel size
Housekeeping power
Specific impulse
Injected mass
Injection C 3
Nominal final mass
Propellant mass
Characteristic s
March 16, 1978
October 21, 1980
(-47 days to Tp*)
P = 16.6 kW
o
PA = 0.6 kW
Isp = 3000 sec
M = 1630 kg
C3 = 54.2 (km/sec)2
Mf = 1163 kg
MP = 457 kg
TP = Time of Encke perihelion
Table 3. Forbidden thruster combinations
Number of
Thrusters
to be Fired Forbidden Combinations
5 None
4 2347, 3457, 4567, 1567, 1267, 1237,
2467, 1357
3 237, 347, 457, 567, 167, 127, 247,
357, 467, 157, 267, 137, 234, 345,
456, 156, 123, 346, 135
2 25, 36, 47*
1 None
Allowed combinations
For six-thruster system, thruster © is
removed.
For five-thruster system, ® and ( is
removed.
Forbidden combinations for six-thruster system
and five-thruster system can be inferred from
the above table.
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SUCCESSFUL PATH
- - - FAILURE
pi0) = TRANSITION PROBABILITY FROM i th TO i+l t STAGE,
ALONG SUCCESSFUL PATH j
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS = 7rT pij)
I
Fig. 1. Probability tree for mission operational process
MODEL FAILURE PROBABILITY I SIMULATE FAILURES, ALTERNATE PATHCONTROLS AND BURN CONTROLS
MISSION SUCCESS PROBABILITY
Fig. 2. Risk factors and risk assessment
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Fig. 3. An example of a reliability curve
Y
Fig. 4. Geometric configuration of
7-thruster system
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